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OUR HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY AND ITS SOMETIMES 
PECULIAR RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS* 
DAVID W. ROBERTSON** 
INTRODUCTION 
Two of my favorite experiences as a student were a 7th grade course in 
civics—in which I was introduced to (and believed I fully understood) the 
concepts of separation of powers and federalism—and a law school course in 
admiralty law, which was taught in a blinding hurry for two hours every Friday 
afternoon by a frantically busy practitioner who used no casebook, prepared no 
course materials, and took his teaching job to consist mainly in citing as many 
Supreme Court maritime decisions and talking as fast as he could.  Probably 
neither of these descriptions sound like as much fun as these two courses 
actually were.  You will have to take my word for it, and further, that I love to 
try to teach my admiralty students 7th grade civics and how to litigate 
admiralty cases, and that this ongoing experiment works best when everything 
happens all at once. 
This Article is part of that experiment.  It tries to survey and critique the 
relationship that our High Court of Admiralty—the United States Supreme 
Court—has had with our Supreme Maritime Legislature—the United States 
Congress—over this nation’s entire history.  Right away, you can see why I am 
careful to call all of this an experiment. 
Let’s get a couple of preliminaries out of the way first.  Lawyers who 
specialize in a field of law that gets only sporadic attention from the United 
States Supreme Court often seem inclined, perhaps as a matter of professional 
habit, to deplore the Court’s evident lack of expertise and to disparage the 
Court’s contributions to the field.  Sometimes we actually pout about this, 
complaining that the Court does not even seem to care about our field.  For 
example, a leading patent lawyer recently wrote that “the Justices seem to treat 
patent cases as second class citizens and write opinions that read as though 
 
 * An earlier version of this Article formed the basis for a presentation to the Louisiana 
Association for Justice, at a conference titled High Stakes on the High Seas, in New Orleans on 
August 13, 2010. 
** W. Page Keeton Chair in Tort Law and University Distinguished Teaching Professor, 
University of Texas at Austin. 
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they were dictated while standing waiting for the elevator.”1  Speaking as the 
leading admiralty jurist in the land, Judge John R. Brown wrote shortly before 
his death in 1993 that “[i]n the past fifteen years the justices of the Supreme 
Court have abandoned their [constitutional] role as admiralty judges.”2  And a 
few years ago, I was probably inappropriately blunt in expressing my fear “that 
the modern Court neither understands admiralty nor regards it as important.”3 
This Article is not more whining about the Court’s general performance, 
although sharp criticism of some of the Court’s decisions is entailed.  Instead, 
here I offer a critique of the Court’s approach to integrating the admiralty and 
maritime enactments of Congress into the larger field of federal maritime law.  
Integrating statutes into a field of judge-made law4 is an intrinsically 
problematic process.  In our nation and in all of the states, constitutional 
statutes are superior authority: courts must yield.5  At the same time, a high 
 
 1. Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning Lead 
to Thin Law?, Lecture at Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review Annual Nies Memorial 
Lecture in Intellectual Property (Mar. 16, 1999), in 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 16 (1999).  
See also John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 686 (2009) (“[Supreme] 
Court review of any particular question in patent law has typically been rare in occurrence and 
spotty in performance.”). 
 2. Hon. John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 249, 283 (1993). 
 3. David W. Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for a 
National Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 295 (1998).  See also David W. Robertson, 
The Supreme Court’s Approach to Determining Seaman Status: Discerning the Law Amid Loose 
Language and Catchphrases, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 547, 555, 556 (2003) (describing early 
seaman status decisions by the Supreme Court as “inconsistent” and filled with meaningless 
“catchphrases”) (citations omitted). 
 4. “No area of federal law is judge-made at its source to such an extent as is the law of 
admiralty.”  Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting).  See also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489–90 (2008) (“[M]aritime 
law, . . . falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law court, 
subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”); 
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207 (1994) (quoting United States v. Reliable 
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975)) (“[T]he Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in 
formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime.”); Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 
U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“Congress has largely left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the 
controlling rules of admiralty law.”); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 
323 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is appropriate to recall that the preponderant body of 
maritime law comes from this Court and not from Congress.”). 
 5. This is of course the thrust of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, 
cl. 2, which provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
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court in charge of a field of common law will need to realize that a statutory 
enactment in that field sits atop a venerable edifice of common law.  The 
statute must be fully respected while at the same time confined to its natural 
and appropriate sphere of operation.  One way to say this is that the high court 
should generally presume that the statute does not change any features of the 
pre-existing common law that are not explicitly altered or altered by necessary 
implication.  State courts sometimes introduce this idea by characterizing 
statutes changing common law rules as being “in derogation” of the common 
law.6 
The critique of the Court’s treatment of maritime statutes begins in Part I 
with a sketch of the constitutional structure of admiralty that delimits the 
respective roles of the Court and Congress.  Parts II and III then briefly 
summarize nineteenth century theory and practice respecting the role of 
maritime statutes.  These sections suggest that, while nineteenth century theory 
included limits on Congress that have disappeared from modern admiralty 
theory, in practice the nineteenth century Court was probably more respectful 
of congressional input into maritime law than the modern Court has sometimes 
been. 
Parts IV and V treat twentieth century theory and practice respecting the 
Court’s treatment of maritime statutes.  Part V shows the modern Court 
typically giving full and careful respect to congressional input into the federal 
maritime law, but we also see the Court veering at times between overt 
resistance and a kind of exaggerated or mock deference to Congress.  Part VI 
concludes the article with some observations about the potential practical 
effects of this Article’s historical and conceptual conclusions. 
 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
 6. See, e.g., State v. Courchesne, 998 A.2d 1, 38 (Conn. 2010) (quoting State v. Floyd, 584 
A.2d 1157, 1168 (Conn. 1991)) (“[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law should not be 
construed to alter the common law further than their words demand.”); Miller v. Lammico, 973 
So.2d 693, 704 (La. 2008) (citing Dumas v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Culture, Recreation & Tourism, 
828 So.2d 530, 537–38 (La. 2002)) (“[S]tatutes in derogation of established rights should be 
strictly construed.”); Energy Serv. Co. v. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190, 194 
n.17 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1969)) (“While 
Texas follows the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are not to be strictly 
construed, it is recognized that if a statute creates a liability unknown to the common law, or 
deprives a person of a common law right, the statute will be strictly construed in the sense that it 
will not be extended beyond its plain meaning or applied to cases not clearly within its 
purview.”). 
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I.  CONGRESS AND THE HIGH ADMIRALTY COURT: THE FORMAL RELATIONSHIP 
In its 1924 decision in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson,7 the Supreme 
Court gave a good summary of the constitutional structure of admiralty and 
maritime law: 
[National Maritime Law] 
[S]ection 2 of article 3 of the Constitution, . . . extends the judicial power of 
the United States to “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” 
  As there could be no cases of “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” in the 
absence of some maritime law under which they could arise, the provision 
presupposes the existence in the United States of a law of that character.  Such 
a law or system of law existed in colonial times and during the Confederation, 
and commonly was applied in the adjudication of admiralty and maritime 
cases.  It embodied the principles of the general maritime law, sometimes 
called the law of the sea, with modifications and supplements adjusting it to 
conditions and needs on this side of the Atlantic.  The framers of the 
Constitution were familiar with that system and proceeded with it in mind.  
Their purpose was not to strike down or abrogate the system, but to place the 
entire subject—its substantive as well as its procedural features—under 
national control, because of its intimate relation to navigation and to interstate 
and foreign commerce.  In pursuance of that purpose, the constitutional 
provision was framed and adopted. 
[Congress’s Role] 
Although containing no express grant of legislative power over the substantive 
law, the [constitutional] provision was regarded from the beginning as 
implicitly investing such power in the United States.  Commentators took that 
view.  Congress acted on it, and the courts, including this court, gave effect to 
it.  Practically therefore the situation is as if that view were written into the 
provision.  [Moreover, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution 
empowers the Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the several powers vested in the government of the 
United States.]  After the Constitution went into effect, the substantive 
[admiralty and maritime] law theretofore in force was not regarded as 
superseded or as being only the law of the several states, but as having become 
the law of the United States—subject to power in Congress to alter, qualify or 
supplement it as experience or changing conditions might require.  When all is 
considered, therefore, there is no room to doubt that the power of Congress 
extends to the entire subject and permits of the exercise of a wide discretion.8 
 
 7. 264 U.S. 375 (1924). 
 8. Id. at 385–86.  To lend clarity to the Court’s summary, the subtitles were added to the 
quotation in the text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] OUR HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY 495 
Translated into modern idiom, the 1924 Court was saying this: The federal 
courts, led by the Supreme Court, are in charge of the field of admiralty and 
maritime law.  Congress is expected to chime in, and when it does, its 
contribution will be honored and its commands heeded. 
As a matter of form, nothing has changed since 1924.  In 2008, the Court 
wrote that “maritime law . . . falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide 
in the manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of Congress to 
legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”9  And the Court 
frequently states: “We have always recognized that federal common law [of 
which court-made admiralty and maritime law is the most important 
example]10 is ‘subject to the paramount authority of Congress.’”11 
II.  NINETEENTH CENTURY THEORY: TWO PRECEPTS RE CONGRESS’S 
ADMIRALTY AUTHORITY 
The Supreme Court did not pay much explicit attention to the legislative-
judicial balance in the admiralty field until the early twentieth century.  But 
two nineteenth century precepts about congressional admiralty authority are 
demonstrable.  First, it was generally assumed that Congress got its authority 
to enact substantive maritime rules from the Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause.12  This assumption entailed a limitation upon Congress.  While the 
federal courts had admiralty jurisdiction over purely intrastate voyages on 
navigable water,13 which meant that these courts had the authority to create 
(they would have said declare) the substantive law applicable, the nineteenth 
century view of the Commerce Clause probably precluded Congress from 
legislating respecting such voyages.14  Therefore, the view that congressional 
 
 9. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 489. 
 10. See sources cited supra note 4. 
 11. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313–14 (1981) (quoting New Jersey v. New 
York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Cases reflecting this assumption include Providence & 
New York Steamship Co. v. Hill Manufacturing Co., 109 U.S. 578, 589 (1883); Lord v. Steamship 
Co., 102 U.S. 541, 544 (1880); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 577 (1875); The Daniel Ball, 77 
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1871); White’s Bank v. Smith, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 646, 655–56 (1868); 
Moore v. American Transportation Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 1, 39 (1861); The Lexington, 47 U.S. 
(6 How.) 344, 392 (1848). 
  As we will see infra in Part IV, the twentieth century view of the source of congressional 
authority in admiralty shifted from the Commerce Clause to a combination of Article III, Section 
2 and the Necessary and Proper Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18).  Arguably, hints of the 
modern view can be seen in some of the nineteenth century cases, including Providence & New 
York Steamship Co., 109 U.S. at 589; Lord, 102 U.S. at 544; The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. at 577; The 
Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 640–41 (1868); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (The 
Genesee Chief), 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453 (1852). 
 13. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 641. 
 14. See Moore, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 39; The Lexington, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 392. 
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maritime authority came from the Commerce Clause meant that the judicial 
branch could govern some admiralty and maritime matters that Congress could 
not touch. 
Second, the Court took the view that “the true limits of maritime law and 
admiralty jurisdiction is undoubtedly . . . exclusively a judicial question, and 
no . . . act of Congress can make it broader, or (it may be added) narrower, 
than the judicial power may determine those limits to be.”15  This view had an 
uncertain conceptual pedigree.16  It also had important and tricky limiting 
implications, and it takes a while to spell these out.17  For present purposes, we 
can summarize by saying that nineteenth century admiralty jurists took the 
 
 15. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. at 576.  See also The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 
522, 527 (1862). 
 16. It probably rested on one or the other of the following assumptions.  First, the Court 
often assumed (seemingly without thinking much about it) that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction 
to the federal courts in § 9 of the 1789 Judiciary Act—“all civil causes of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction”—went to the full extent (at least regarding “civil causes”) of the constitutional 
assignment of “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” to the judicial branch of 
government in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 
73.  See, e.g., The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 640 (“[J]udicial power in all cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution.”); People’s Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. 
(20 How.) 393, 401 (1857) (stating that the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred 
judicial power over cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to United States District Courts); 
Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 463 (1847) (stating that the framers of the United States 
Constitution granted the courts admiralty and maritime jurisdiction).  On this view, all of the 
Court’s jurisdiction-limiting pronouncements would ipso facto have been constitutional rulings 
that obviously no mere statute could change.  Second, it sometimes seems to have been thought 
that—even accepting the possibility that the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal 
courts might be narrower in scope than the constitutionally empowered grant—whenever the 
Court was asked to rule on whether a matter was within admiralty jurisdiction, it presumptively 
chose to deal with the constitutional limits on admiralty rather than the limits of the statutory 
grant.  See, e.g., The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 33–36 (1865) (holding that the jurisdiction 
of admiralty depends on the location where the injury occurred); The St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 
Black) at 526–28 (stating that Congress cannot broaden the limits of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction).  On either of both of these assumptions, setting and maintaining the boundaries of 
the admiralty jurisdiction was the Court’s business and none of Congress’s. 
 17. The functional view that Congress had no authority to speak directly to admiralty’s 
jurisdictional boundaries, and the entailed assumption(s) that all judicial jurisdictional 
pronouncements presumptively referred to the constitutional boundary, not to any “mere” 
statutory boundary, are alien to modern thought, see infra Part IV, and thus difficult to credit or 
grasp.  For a fuller discussion of the nineteenth century view, see David W. Robertson & Michael 
F. Sturley, The Admiralty Extension Act Solution, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 209, 243–64 (2003). 
  The perceived limitation concerned statutes that addressed jurisdictional matters directly.  
It was thought that Congress could probably indirectly effect the extension of federal-court 
jurisdiction over new matters (as the necessity for admiralty governance arose) by enacting 
substantive legislation.  See DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY 
AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
111–18 (Univ. Textbook Ser., 1970). 
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view that once the judiciary had established an admiralty jurisdictional 
boundary, Congress was powerless to change the boundary directly; the 
boundary “could only be extended indirectly, by ‘alter[ing] or supplement[ing] 
the [substantive] maritime law”18 in such a way as to functionally expand 
admiralty’s boundaries. 
III.  NINETEENTH CENTURY PRACTICE: PRAGMATIC RESPECT FOR CONGRESS 
Here we begin to confront a paradox: Whereas nineteenth century theory 
on the scope of Congress’s admiralty authority was more limiting than modern 
theory, the actual practice of the nineteenth century Court seems to have been 
more respectful of congressional authority than some modern decisions have 
been. 
The indicia of the nineteenth century Court’s respect for Congress are 
multiple.  First is the apparent absence of any nineteenth century Supreme 
Court decision declaring an admiralty act of Congress unconstitutional.  
Second is the effort the Court made in its decision in The Genesee Chief to 
sustain an 1845 statute effecting the extension of admiralty jurisdiction over 
specified cases arising on the Great Lakes.19  The wording and legislative 
history of the 1845 statute suggest that Congress was trying to effect the 
extension of jurisdiction indirectly, by creating a new category of Commerce 
Clause-based federal jurisdiction.20  The Genesee Chief Court went further, 
insisting that Congress had accomplished the extension of federal admiralty 
jurisdiction directly.21  In order to reach this conclusion, the Court overruled 
two of its own cases holding that admiralty jurisdiction did not extend over 
cases involving occurrences on navigable but non-tidal water.22  The Genesee 
Chief opinion shows the Court’s enthusiastic agreement with the purposes of 
the statute,23 but this does not destroy the weight of the decision as evidence of 
the Court’s respect for congressional input. 
 
 18. Robertson & Sturley, supra note 17, at 254 (quoting Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas 
Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 48 (1934)). 
 19. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (The Genesee Chief), 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 
(1851). 
 20. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726, 726–27 (1845); ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 
111–12 (discussing the legislative history). 
 21. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 457–58. 
 22. Id. at 455–59 (holding that jurisdiction depends on the navigability of the water, and not 
upon the ebb and flow of the tide).  In so holding, the Court overruled its prior decisions in The 
Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 183 (1837) (stating that the court did not 
have jurisdiction where the vessel engaged in interior navigation and not on tide waters) and The 
Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825) (holding that admiralty jurisdiction is 
limited to waters within the ebb and flow of the tide). 
 23. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 453–54. 
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The third indication of the nineteenth century Court’s respectful approach 
toward legislation is its decision in 1870 in The Daniel Ball, where the Court 
articulated a somewhat expansive version of interstate commerce in order to 
uphold the validity of an act of Congress requiring steam vessels operating on 
navigable waters to be federally licensed.24 
The indicia of the nineteenth century Court’s pragmatism toward maritime 
legislation are also multiple.  As was noted above, the Court was willing to 
work as hard as it did in Genesee Chief on behalf of the statute’s validity in 
significant part because of its whole-hearted agreement with the statute’s 
aims.25  Other indicia of pragmatism include a series of decisions in which the 
Court repeatedly struggled with the meaning, coverage, and validity of the 
hopelessly ill-drafted 1851 Limitation of Liability Act26 in order to uphold the 
Act and give it the meaning the Court believed Congress had intended.27 
Probably the most informative exhibition of pragmatic but still respectful 
treatment of an Act of Congress comes from Justice Joseph Story’s decision 
while riding circuit in Harden v. Gordon.28  At a time when long-standing and 
virtually world-wide maritime law obliged vessel operators to provide free 
medical care (called “cure”) to sick and injured seamen,29 Congress enacted a 
statute requiring certain vessels to carry a medicine chest and stated that “in 
default of having such medicine chest . . . the master or commander of such 
ship or vessel shall provide for and pay for” medical care.30  Justice Story 
acknowledged that the statute carried “a strong implication” that a vessel’s 
compliance with the medicine chest requirement would supplant the ancient 
obligation to provide free medical treatment.31  But he refused to go along with 
the strong implication.  As was his wont, Justice Story provided a copious 
account of his thinking.  Calling the ancient obligation to provide free medical 
care to sick seamen “a charge upon the ship,”32 Justice Story wrote: 
  It is observable, in the first place, that the [statute’s medicine-chest 
requirement] is merely in the affirmative, and contains no words abolishing the 
[medical-care] charge generally, or repealing it in the special cases within the 
purview of the [statute].  The most that can be urged, is, that [the statute] 
 
 24. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565–66 (1870). 
 25. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 453–58. 
 26. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501–30512 (2006) (original version at ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851)). 
 27. See Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1891); Butler v. Bos. & Savannah S.S. Co., 
130 U.S. 527, 555–57 (1889); Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 593–
95 (1883); Lord v. S.S. Co., 102 U.S. 541 (1880); Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 
116–24 (1871). 
 28. 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047). 
 29. Id. at 482. 
 30. Id. at 483–84 (quoting Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 9, 1 Stat. 131, 135). 
 31. Id. at 484. 
 32. Id. at 482. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] OUR HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY 499 
carries a strong implication against the allowance of the [medical-care] charge, 
when the medicine chest is properly supplied.  In the construction of statutes, it 
is a general rule, that merely affirmative words do not vary the antecedent laws 
or rights of parties.33  There must be something [in the statute] inconsistent 
with or repugnant to [these antecedent laws or rights], to draw after a statute an 
implied repeal, either in whole or pro tanto of former laws; otherwise the 
statute is [deemed] to be merely declarative or cumulative. 
The [statute] under consideration [does] indeed make a new provision; for 
independently of [it], there does not seem to exist any obligation on the part of 
[vessels] to provide a medicine chest . . . .  In this view the [statute] is auxiliary 
to . . . the [pre-existing] maritime law; and [it provides] a substantial benefit to 
seamen by enlarging the means of [medical] recovery.  In any other view [the 
statute would be] a serious diminution of [seamen’s] antecedent rights. 
It cannot readily be believed, that congress, which has on so many occasions 
manifested a solicitude to guard the interests and secure the safety of [seamen], 
can have intended to increase their burdens, narrow their privileges, or expose 
them to the danger of still harder sufferings.  If indeed, to avoid such a 
conclusion, one were driven to the indulgence of conjecture, it might not be 
too rash to suppose, that the legislature was doubtful, or not aware of the 
doctrine of the maritime law; and had provided, however inadequately, for the 
relief of seamen by a measure of precaution, which might mitigate the evils of 
sudden calamity.34 
Justice Story went on at some further length, but the foregoing quotation 
gets the gist of his reasoning.  The passage is worth close study.  It exemplifies 
respectful rejection of an unwise and just barely avoidable implication in an 
otherwise beneficial statute.  It is closely akin to the “statutes in derogation” 
attitude35 sometimes taken by modern state courts toward legislative incursions 
into a well-developed common law field. 
IV.  TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORY: ALTERATION OF THE TWO NINETEENTH 
CENTURY PRECEPTS 
By the time the Court composed its 1924 summary of admiralty’s 
constitutional structure in Panama Railroad Co.,36 it had become clear that the 
constitutional source of congressional authority in the admiralty and maritime 
field is not the Commerce Clause, as had been thought, but rather the 
combination of Article III, Section 2 (the grant of admiralty and maritime 
 
 33. Justice Story cited nothing in support of this general rule of construction.  It seems to be 
his version of the “statutes in derogation” idea.  See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying 
text. 
 34. Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 484.  To lend clarity to Justice Story’s argument, some minor, 
unsignaled alterations in paragraphing were made to the quotation in the text. 
 35. See sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 36. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385–86 (1924); see supra Part I. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
500 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:491 
authority to the federal judicial power) and Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (the 
Necessary and Proper Clause).37  The thrust of this change was to increase the 
power of Congress, because it meant that congressional authority would 
automatically swim alongside judicial authority in all cases in which the 
Constitution authorizes the federal government to impose admiralty and 
maritime governance.38  As we saw in Part II, the Commerce Clause was 
sometimes deficient in this respect.39 
The jettisoning of the nineteenth century view that Congress cannot 
directly address admiralty’s jurisdictional boundaries occurred somewhat 
later,40 but the matter has become settled.  The modern viewpoint is quite clear: 
Constitutional language may—indeed presumptively probably does—have 
potentially broader coverage than identical statutory language.41  So when the 
 
 37. Pre-Panama Railroad cases expressing the new theory include Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214 (1917) (“In consequence of [Article III, Section 2 and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause], Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which 
shall prevail throughout the country”); Ex parte Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 15 (1891) (stating that the 
limits of admiralty jurisdiction do not come from the commerce power but from a separate and 
distinct grant by the Constitution); Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527, 
557 (1889) (arguing that the Constitution’s “exclusive” jurisdictional grant of admiralty to the 
federal courts implies a corresponding grant to the national legislature).  See also supra note 12 
and accompanying text. 
 38. Panama R.R. Co., 264 U.S. at 385–86 (relating the early history of admiralty jurisdiction 
at the time of the founding and concluding that “there is no room to doubt that the power of 
Congress extends to the entire subject and permits the exercise of a wide discretion”). 
 39. In a well-known law review article, Judge John R. Brown repeatedly indicated that the 
federal courts’ admiralty authority should be regarded as stronger than Congress’s because the 
courts have a direct constitutional grant of authority in Article III, whereas Congress lacks such a 
grant in Article I.  Brown, supra note 2, at 251, 263, 269, 282.  This strikes me as a somewhat 
formalistic argument.  For me, the importance of the modern theory of congressional authority—
the theory that congressional authority comes from Article III and is hence coterminous in scope 
with judicial authority—is that it strengthened rather than weakened Congress’s position. 
 40. The emergency of the modern view is difficult to pinpoint.  The authors of AEA Solution 
argue that it had not yet occurred at the time of Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 
U.S. 21 (1934).  Robertson & Sturley, supra note 17, at 252–62.  This argument finds some 
support in United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933) (“Congress, by incorporating in the 
statute the very language of the constitutional grant of power, has made its exercise of the power 
co-extensive with the grant.”).  The supposition that the modern view had not yet emerged in the 
1930s is also supported by the fact that an excellent article by a prominent scholar—Stanley 
Morrison, The Constitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 44 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (1934)—
wholly fails to see it.  But see Clarence A. Miller, The Foreclosure of Vessel Mortgages in 
Admiralty, 70 U. PENN. L. REV. 22, 25–26 (1921) (footnotes omitted) (“The [constitutional] grant 
of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal district courts is not self-executing.  Not only must the 
Constitution give the court capacity to receive jurisdictional powers, but an Act of Congress must 
supply them.  The Congress may distribute all the jurisdiction made available to the court by the 
Constitutional grant, or to such extent as it pleases, fall short of complete distribution.”). 
 41. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. 
L. REV. 259, 274 (1950)  (footnote omitted) (“[The] assumption that the same verbal form means 
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Court says “no admiralty jurisdiction,” it presumptively means that the matter 
is not within the statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts 
and is not expressing a constitutional doctrine.42  Therefore, Congress is 
probably free to amend the statutory grant so as to directly expand (or, 
conceivably, to contract) the federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction.43 
 
the same thing wherever it is used . . . [is] false to everyday life, as it is false to the underlying 
spirit of constitutional law.  It is entirely reasonable, on the contrary, to assume that 
[constitutional] language setting permanent bounds to federal power over a given subject-matter 
may bear a wider meaning than language, verbally identical, used in the context of an easily 
amendable statute.”). 
 42. Cf. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 681 n.5 (1982) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“The [admiralty] jurisdictional issue has both a constitutional and a statutory 
element, since both Art. III and 28 U.S.C. § 1333 must support the exercise of jurisdiction in this 
case.  [In order to uphold the district court’s jurisdiction, the] Court necessarily must find that 
both provisions are satisfied.  Because construction of the statute is sufficient to support the result 
I would reach [no jurisdiction], I intimate no views on the constitutional extent of Art. III 
admiralty jurisdiction.”). 
 43. In upholding the constitutionality of the 1948 Admiralty Extension Act, the court in 
Fematt v. City of Los Angeles gave an excellent statement of the modern viewpoint on Congress’s 
authority to alter admiralty jurisdictional boundaries.  196 F. Supp. 89, 91 (S.D. Cal. 1961); see 
also Admiralty Extension Act, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30101 
(2006)).  The court first noted:  “Ever since The Plymouth, the courts in the United States have 
held that ship-to-shore torts were not maritime in nature and consequently [were] without the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the [federal] district courts.”  Fematt, 196 F. Supp. at 90 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  The Admiralty Extension Act purported to change that rule.  The 
Fematt Court continued: 
If the Supreme Court in The Plymouth held that ship-to-shore torts are not maritime in 
nature and thus not within the admiralty jurisdictional grant of Art. III, § 2 of the 
Constitution, nothing that Congress does can change that.  If, on the other hand, that 
which is the more likely occurred in The Plymouth, that ship-to-shore torts were only held 
to be without the scope of the Judiciary Acts, Congress can surely remedy that.  This, 
after all, is a familiar theory expounded in dealing with the language used in the 
Constitution and identically in the Judiciary Acts with respect to jurisdiction of the district 
courts over cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 
Id. at 91 (emphasis added). 
  The Fematt Court did not cite anything supporting its “familiar theory” claim, but it may 
have been referring to Charles Black’s article, supra note 41, or to Herbert Wechsler, Federal 
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224–25 
(1948) (“It is unfortunate [that the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction uses] the very 
language that the Constitution gives to measure the authority of Congress to vest such jurisdiction 
in a federal court. . . .  Needless to say, Congress has not meant to grant the district courts a 
general jurisdiction in every case . . . in which it could confer judicial power . . . .  The courts 
have been obliged, therefore, to draw a line between the [constitutional] power and the [statutory 
grant], even though their verbal measure is the same.”). 
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V.  TWENTIETH CENTURY PRACTICE: INCONSISTENT ATTITUDES 
In the subsections below, we will look at three clusters of twentieth (and 
twenty-first) century cases.  This presentation is not chronological; as we will 
see, no one can know where we are at the moment or where we might be 
headed. 
A. Normal Treatment of Statutes: Pragmatic Respect for Congress 
Probably at least half of the modern Court’s maritime work involves 
statutory issues.  For the most part, the Court shows a normal—cautiously 
respectful—attitude toward congressional contributions to the field.  The 
examples in this section are just some of the many instances that could be 
cited. 
It makes sense to look first—let’s call it Exhibit A—at the Court’s 
Constitution-based decisions upholding the authority of Congress to bring 
mortgages on ships under the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts and 
into federal maritime law,44 to enact a workers’ compensation system for 
maritime workers,45 and to provide for the punishment of crimes committed on 
United States vessels in foreign waters.46  In all of these decisions, the Court 
was unanimous as to the existence of congressional authority.  A closely 
related group of decisions are those in which the Court has seemingly assumed 
with full confidence that the 1948 Admiralty Extension Act,47 expanding 
admiralty jurisdiction to include ship-to-shore torts, is constitutional.48 
Exhibit B in this “normal treatment” presentation comprises a group of 
cases in which the Court grappled with the coverage and meaning of maritime 
legislation without provoking any member of the Court to dissent.  Here I 
group four decisions interpreting the 1972 amendments to the Longshore and 
 
 44. See Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 52 (1934) (upholding the 
1920 Ship Mortgage Act, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 1000–06 (current version codified (with the Federal 
Maritime Lien Act) at 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301–31343 (2006)). 
 45. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (upholding the Longshoremen’s and 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version, titled the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006)). 
 46. See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1933) (upholding jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 272 (1925–1926) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)) and 28 U.S.C. § 102 
(1925–1926) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (2006))). 
 47. Admiralty Extension Act, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 
30101 (2006)). 
 48. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.¸ 513 U.S. 527, 532–34 
(1995); Sisson v. Ruby¸ 497 U.S. 358, 359–60 n.1 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 
U.S. 668, 676–77, 677 n.7 (1982); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 209–10 (1971); 
Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209–10 (1963). 
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Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA)49 and three decisions taking a 
robust view of the coverage of the 1920 Jones Act.50 
Exhibit C is a group of decisions in which the Court was sharply divided 
over statutory treatment issues.  Such disagreements are obviously far from 
unusual.  When such disagreements arise, typically both sides of the debate 
will have principled and plausible reasons for the statutory views espoused.  
For example, the Court in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray split 5-4 over whether 
an offshore oil and gas worker—injured on a fixed platform in Louisiana 
waters while welding a gas flow line—was engaged in “maritime 
employment” so as to come within the coverage of the LHWCA under 33 
U.S.C. § 902(3).51  Justice White wrote the majority opinion, which concluded 
no (leaving the worker with presumptively inferior state workers’ 
compensation benefits).52  I have long thought that Justice Marshall’s 
dissenting opinion, which would have upheld LHWCA coverage,53 expresses a 
wiser view of the statute than the majority’s.  But I do not believe anyone 
would say that Justice White’s views cannot be found in the statutory 
framework.  Several other decisions are like Herb’s Welding in that they show 
 
 49. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (1970)).  See Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1983) (holding that 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) enables workers 
covered by the LHWCA to sue their employers for negligence respecting the condition and use of 
vessels operated by the employers); Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 716–17 (1980) 
(holding that the landward expansion of the LHWCA that occurred in 1972, see 33 U.S.C. 
§ 903(a), does not operate to preempt state laws that provide workers’ compensation benefits for 
accidents within LHWCA coverage); P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 82–83 (1979) 
(giving a broad interpretation to the term “longshoring operations” in 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)); Ne. 
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 265–68 (1977) (giving a similarly broad 
interpretation). 
 50. The Jones Act was enacted in 1920 to give seamen injured in the course of their 
employment a negligence cause of action against their employers.  See ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 
1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)).  The unanimous decisions 
taking a broad view of the Act’s coverage are Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., 543 U.S. 481, 
491, 494–95 (2005) (holding that all vessel crew members are Jones Act seamen and that all 
apparatus capable of moving goods or people across water are vessels for Jones Act—and most 
other—purposes); McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 353–54 (1991) 
(rejecting an argument that a worker must aid in the navigation of a vessel in order to be a Jones 
Act seaman); and O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 37, 39 (1943) 
(holding that a seaman can be in the course of employment for Jones Act purposes even when 
injured ashore). 
 51. 470 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1985); Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. II 1984) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1982)). 
 52. Herb’s Welding, Inc., 470 U.S. at 427. 
 53. Id. at 450 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the Court in principled disagreement over LHWCA issues without exhibiting 
any remarkable attitudes toward congressional input into admiralty.54 
Exhibit D—the most important and controversial exhibit in this normal-
treatment section—is the much-discussed decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, where the Court split 6-2 on whether general maritime law 
(federal maritime common law) allows the families of persons killed on the 
high seas to recover nonpecuniary damages for loss of society 
(companionship).55  Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, concluding 
that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)56 includes a congressional 
directive against the availability of such damages.57  Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun strongly disagreed, asserting that “there is no congressional 
directive.”58  Because Judge John R. Brown concluded his great career as the 
country’s leading admiralty jurist by proclaiming (in a posthumously published 
article) the dissenters correct and the majority egregiously wrong—Judge 
Brown said, the majority justices “abandoned their [constitutional] role as 
admiralty judges”59—I have put Higginbotham in the normal-treatment 
category only with great diffidence.  In the five paragraphs below, I defend my 
choice. 
The bare essentials for understanding the Higginbotham issue are these.  In 
1886 the Court held in The Harrisburg that admiralty afforded no remedy for 
wrongful death in the absence of an applicable statute.60  In 1920 Congress 
enacted DOHSA to create “a remedy in admiralty for wrongful deaths more 
 
 54. See Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 158, 172, 175, 179 
(1981) (3-3-2 split over the meaning of the term “negligence” in 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)); Edmonds v. 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271–73, 274–75 (1979) (5-3 split on whether 
LHWCA workers who succeed in establishing “vessel” negligence in actions under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 905(b) should have their recovery reduced in proportion to a percentage of fault assigned to 
their employers); Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 214, 224–25 (1969) (6-3 
split over the operation of the “navigable waters” limit on LHWCA coverage in the pre-1972 
version of  33 U.S.C. § 903 (1970)); Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 124, 132 (1962) 
(6-2 split over the meaning of a LHWCA coverage-limiting provision that Congress deleted in the 
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
576, §§ 2(c), 21, 86 Stat. 1251, 1265). 
  Calbeck merits special mention, in that Justice Stewart’s dissent accused the majority of 
“judicial legerdemain,” which implies mistreatment of the statute.  Id. at 132.  Four decades ago I 
argued—at what now seems to me inordinate length—that the “judicial legerdemain” charge was 
false.  See ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 304–18.  I still believe this. 
 55. 436 U.S. 618, 618–19 (1978). 
 56. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308 (originally enacted as Act of 
Mar. 30, 1920, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537). 
 57. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 618, 625. 
 58. Id. at 626, 629 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 59. Brown, supra note 2, at 283. 
 60. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 212–13 (1886). 
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than three miles from shore.”61  The relevant DOHSA provision is 46 U.S.C. 
§ 30303, which provides: 
  The recovery in an action under this [Act] shall be a fair compensation for 
the pecuniary loss sustained by the individuals for whose benefit the action is 
brought. . . .62 
In its Moragne and Gaudet decisions in 1970 and 1974, the Court overruled 
The Harrisburg, created a non-statutory wrongful death remedy for maritime 
deaths—it will be convenient to call this “the Moragne remedy”—and held 
that the Moragne remedy includes nonpecuniary damages for loss of society.63  
The stage was thus set for Higginbotham, a high seas fatal accident case, where 
the Court had to deal with the conflict between the Moragne remedy’s 
provision of nonpecuniary loss of society damages and DOHSA’s restriction to 
“pecuniary loss.”64  (No such question had arisen in Moragne and Gaudet, both 
of which involved fatal accidents in territorial waters and hence outside 
DOHSA’s coverage.) 
In concluding that the Moragne-DOHSA conflict was fatal to the 
applicability of the Moragne remedy to a high-seas accident, Justice Stevens 
said the following about DOHSA: 
[Respecting deaths beyond three miles from shore, DOHSA] has limited 
survivors to recovery of their pecuniary losses. . . .  DOHSA should be the 
courts’ primary guide as they refine the [Moragne] remedy, both because of 
the interest in uniformity and because Congress’ considered judgment has 
great force in its own right. . . .  [DOHSA] announces Congress’ considered 
judgment on . . . damages . . .  The Act does not address every issue of 
wrongful-death law . . . but when it does speak directly to a question, the 
courts are not free to “supplement” Congress’ answer so thoroughly that the 
Act becomes meaningless.65 
 
 61. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 620 (citing Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761–
768 (1976) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308 (2006)). 
 62. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 
30303 (2006)). 
 63. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970) (unanimously 
overruling The Harrisburg and creating a new non-statutory maritime-death remedy); Sea-Land 
Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 573–74, 587–89 (1974) (5-4 decision holding that the 
Moragne remedy includes nonpecuniary damages for loss of society). 
 64. See 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30303 (2006)); 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623. 
 65. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623–25 (citations omitted).  Justice Stevens’s last-quoted 
sentence must have rankled Judge Brown considerably.  In Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., Judge 
Brown had written that Moragne effectively consigned DOHSA to “the briney deep.”  523 F.2d 
793, 798 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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For the dissenters, Justice Marshall countered: 
[The majority would be right] if Congress could be said to have made a 
determination to disallow any recovery except pecuniary loss with regard to 
deaths arising on the high seas.  But Congress made no such determination 
when it passed DOHSA.  Congress was writing in 1920 against the 
background of The Harrisburg, under which a remedy for death on the high 
seas depended entirely on the existence of a statute allowing recovery.  This 
rule left many dependents without any remedy and was viewed as “a disgrace 
to civilized people.”  By enacting DOHSA, Congress sought to “bring our 
maritime law into line with the laws of those enlightened nations which confer 
a right of action for death at sea.” 
  The Court today uses this ameliorative, remedial statute as the foundation 
of a decision denying a remedy.  It purports to find, [in DOHSA’s pecuniary-
loss provision], a “considered judgment” by Congress that recovery must be 
limited to pecuniary loss. . . .  Nothing in this [provision], however, states that 
recovery must be so limited; certainly Congress was principally concerned, not 
with limiting recovery, but with ensuring that those suing under DOHSA were 
able to recover at least their pecuniary loss. 
  Although recognizing that DOHSA was a response to The Harrisburg, the 
majority opinion otherwise ignores the legislative history of the Act.  The 
fundamental premise of the opinion—that Congress meant to “limi[t] survivors 
to recovery of their pecuniary losses,”—is simply assumed. 
  Because there is no congressional directive to foreclose nonstatutory 
remedies, I believe that maritime law principles require us to uphold the 
remedy for loss of society at issue here.66 
Justice Marshall’s treatment of DOHSA bears a close resemblance to 
Justice Story’s long-ago treatment of the medicine-chest statute in Harden v. 
Gordon.67  Both justices were confronted with a strong statutory implication 
that seemed inimical to the purposes and spirit of maritime law.  In deciding 
whether the implication could be resisted, each justice looked at whatever 
legislative history was available, and each examined the maritime law context 
into which Congress had inserted the statute.  Both concluded that no 
disrespect for Congress would be entailed in resisting the implication. 
Judge Brown criticized the Higginbotham majority for not following 
Justice Story’s Harden v. Gordon lead.68  I do not disagree with that criticism.  
But I do (again, with much diffidence) disagree with Judge Brown’s further 
 
 66. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 628–29 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397, 400).  The internal quotations that are not obviously from Justice 
Stevens’s opinion are from Senate and House Committee reports. 
 67. 11 F. Cas. 480, 484 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047).  See supra notes 28–34 and 
accompanying text. 
 68. See Brown, supra note 2, at 278–79. 
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conclusion that Higginbotham’s treatment of DOHSA was unusual, untoward, 
and wholly out of line.69  If Justice Stevens had been confronted with Harden 
as a binding precedent,70 he could have plausibly distinguished it along the 
following lines: When DOHSA created an admiralty action for wrongful death 
at sea and stated that the recovery in such an action “shall be a fair 
compensation for . . . pecuniary loss,”71 it so directly implied “pecuniary only” 
as to be regarded as so commanding.  In contrast, the implication at stake in 
Harden was less direct: When Congress said that vessels failing to meet the 
medicine-chest requirement must provide free medical care, it was not 
necessarily commanding that no free medical care was otherwise due.  
Moreover, the area of pre-existing maritime law to which the medicine-chest 
statute was an addition powerfully and clearly called for free medical care for 
sick and hurt seamen, whereas there was no maritime law provision at all for 
loss of society damages when DOHSA was enacted. 
As a member of the Higginbotham Court, I would have voted with Justice 
Marshall.  But I cannot conclude that Justice Stevens was wrong to find a 
congressional command where I would not.  I think both segments of the Court 
performed within the tradition of careful, respectful attention to congressional 
input into maritime law.  Their disagreement as to what DOHSA presently 
should mean was a principled one, and neither side’s view lacked plausibility. 
B. Inappropriate Resistance to Congressional Directives 
Justice Frankfurter once suggested that Justice James McReynolds (who 
sat on the Supreme Court from 1914 to 1941) should be remembered as “the 
Justice under whose lead the most unhappy admiralty doctrines were 
promulgated.”72  However that may be, Justice McReynolds clearly displayed 
an unacceptable degree of contempt for Congress in three decisions he 
authored for the Court. 
In Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., the McReynolds-led Court 
confronted a statute in which Congress had unmistakably tried to provide that 
seamen injured on the job could sue their employers for negligence.73  The 
Court’s decision (in The Osceola) denying seamen that right was couched, in 
major part, in terms of the fellow servant doctrine,74 so Congress tried to create 
 
 69. See id. at 283. 
 70. Remember that Harden was not a Supreme Court decision; it was decided by Justice 
Story while sitting as circuit justice for Maine. 
 71. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 30303 (2006)). 
 72. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 563 n.6 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); Kickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 
263 U.S. 149 (1923). 
 73. 247 U.S. 372, 382–83 (1918). 
 74. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
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the negligence cause of action by enacting a pro tanto repeal of the fellow 
servant doctrine.75  Justice McReynolds’s Chelentis opinion pointed to other 
language in The Osceola (aside from the fellow-servant pronouncements) 
speaking against the negligence cause of action and blithely dismissed the 
statute as “irrelevant.”76  The Gilmore and Black treatise describes Chelentis as 
the Court’s “giv[ing] Congress a lesson on ‘How to read a case’ of a type 
familiar to any first term law student.”77 
Justice McReynolds also managed to thwart repeated efforts by Congress 
to enable longshoremen injured on navigable waters to seek relief under state 
workers’ compensation statutes.  In 1917, the Court held that general maritime 
law precluded longshoremen from such relief.78  Later that same year, and 
again in 1922, Congress enacted statutes aimed at reversing the Court’s 
declared prohibition.79  In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart80 and Washington 
v. W.C. Dawson & Co.,81 the McReynolds-led Court declared these statutes 
unconstitutional82 on the (highly implausible to modern thought) ground that 
injuries to maritime workers on navigable waters fell within a monolithic 
corpus of federal maritime law (much of it yet-undiscovered and undeclared), 
where state legislatures were forbidden (by Article 3, Section 2) to trod. 
 
 75. Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 376. 
 76. Id. at 384. 
 77. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 325 (2d ed. 
1975).  In 1920, Congress responded to the Chelentis Court’s rejection of its attempt to create a 
maritime-law cause of action for seamen by enacting the Jones Act, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 
1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)), which achieved the goal by 
making the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 65–66 (1908) (codified as 
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2006)), applicable in seamen’s injury cases.  In Panama 
Railroad Co. v. Johnson, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Jones Act, but only after 
effectively rewriting the statute so as to avoid perceived constitutional problems.  264 U.S. 375, 
390–91 (1924).  For a full account, see David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Understanding 
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson: The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Seaman’s Elections 
under the Jones Act, 14 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 229 (2001–2002); see also David W. Robertson & 
Michael F. Sturley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Jones Act Cases: Choosing the Forum Versus 
Choosing the Procedure, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 649, 656–59 (1999). 
 78. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 212 (1917). 
 79. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395, declared unconstitutional by Knickerbocker 
Ice. Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634, 634–35, 
declared unconstitutional by Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). 
 80. 253 U.S. at 160, 163–64. 
 81. 264 U.S. at 222, 227–28. 
 82. When Professors Gilmore and Black wrote in 1975 that “apparently [no maritime Act of 
Congress] has ever been declared unconstitutional,” they were apparently forgetting momentarily 
about Knickerbocker and Dawson.  GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 77, at 47.  A later section of 
the treatise recounts the constitutional holdings in the two cases.  Id. at 407–08. 
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We have seen nothing like Justice McReynolds’s three slaps at Congress 
since his era.  But there is at least one modern decision83 that seems to belong 
in the category of inappropriate judicial resistance to Congress.  At the time of 
the Court’s 5-4 decision in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,84 Section 7 of 
the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) read as follows: 
  The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or 
remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter.  Nor shall this chapter 
apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any 
State, or to any navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone.85 
 Does this provision’s first sentence allow state death statutes to apply to 
fatal accidents on the high seas?  On its face, it plainly does.  But the five-
member majority (in an opinion by Justice O’Connor) thought Section 7 
expressed a very bad idea, so they wove a complex argument purportedly 
based on legislative history to conclude otherwise, stating: 
[T]he first sentence of [Section] 7 was intended only to serve as a jurisdictional 
saving clause, ensuring that state courts enjoyed the right to entertain causes of 
action and provide wrongful death remedies both for accidents arising on 
territorial waters and, under DOHSA, for accidents occurring more than one 
marine league from shore.86 
 The Court went so far as to call this torturing of the statute’s language “a 
natural reading.”87 Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Powell gave a 
completely convincing demonstration “that the Court’s reading of [Section] 7 
is at odds with the language of the statute and its legislative history.”88  Justice 
Powell concluded his demonstration by scolding the majority, stating: 
  The Court argues that preserving state rights of action for death on the high 
seas, in accordance with the plain language of [Section] 7, would undermine a 
uniform federal remedy and conflict with the exclusive, federal character of 
most aspects of admiralty law.  I agree that such a result undercuts a federal 
 
 83. I think some analysts might say “at least two.”  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court 
in Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 323–24 (1983) (holding that 
workers who are neither longshoremen nor harbor workers can satisfy the LHWCA’s “maritime 
employment” requirement, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (2006), merely by being hurt on navigable water 
in the course of their employment) seems to take great liberties with congressional language; the 
Act seems to tie its “maritime employment” requirement tightly to longshoremen and harbor 
workers.  See Justice Stevens’s persuasive dissent, Perini, 459 U.S. at 325–43 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  It is a close call whether Justice O’Connor took the Perini majority too far from the 
statute.  For present purposes, I am saying, “almost.” 
 84. 477 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 85. 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982) (current version codified with some minor differences in 
language at 46 U.S.C. § 30308 (2006)). 
 86. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 221. 
 87. Id. at 223. 
 88. Id. at 233 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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uniformity that seems desirable here, but it is not the role of this Court to 
reconsider the wisdom of a policy choice that Congress has already made. . . . 
We should respect the outcome of the legislative process and preserve State 
rights of action for wrongful death on the high seas until Congress legislates 
otherwise.89 
C. Ersatz Deference 
Obviously the principle of separation of powers is offended when the 
Court ignores a clear congressional command.  It seems to me equally 
offensive for the Court to cloak its own determinations in the guise of 
imaginary congressional commands.  The exhibit here is the much criticized90 
1990 decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., where the Court purported to 
find two commands in the Jones Act—an unstated command and a penumbral 
implication—that are realistically impossible to attribute to Congress.91  As we 
saw in Part VA, Judge Brown’s career-capping diatribe against “the justices of 
the Supreme Court [who] have abandoned their role as admiralty judges”92 
included the Higginbotham majority as well as the Miles Court.  But I believe 
Miles—a unanimous decision, and a very dramatic one—was a uniquely abrupt 
departure from anything the Court had theretofore done or said. 
Our examination of Miles will be facilitated by looking first at The Arizona 
v. Anelich, which went unmentioned in Miles despite having involved the 
identical statutory-treatment problem.93  Remember94 that the 1920 Jones 
Act,95 which changed maritime law by providing that seamen’s employers are 
liable for negligently injuring them, effected this change by adopting by 
reference the provisions of the 1908 Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA).96  The issue in The Arizona was whether a seaman bringing a Jones 
Act negligence action against his employer was subject to the affirmative 
defense of assumption of risk.97  The Court began its analysis by noting: “[I]t 
has been settled by numerous [pre-Jones Act] decisions of this court that 
assumption of risk is a defense . . . .” in a FELA action.98  FELA did not 
 
 89. Id. at 240–41 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 90. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 2, at 279, 283–84; Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. 
Apex Marine Corp: The Mischief of Seeking “Uniformity” and “Legislative Intent” in Maritime 
Personal Injury Cases, 55 LA. L. REV. 745, 752, 784–85, 796–98 (1995). 
 91. 498 U.S. 19, 27, 37 (1990). 
 92. Brown, supra note 2, at 283. 
 93. 298 U.S. 110, 115 (1936). 
 94. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 95. Ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 
(2006)). 
 96. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 65–66 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2006)). 
 97. The Arizona, 298 U.S. at 115. 
 98. Id. at 119 (citing Boldt v. Pa. R.R. Co., 245 U.S. 441, 445 (1918)); Jacobs v. S. Ry. Co., 
241 U.S. 229, 235 (1916); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 503 (1914)). 
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expressly so provide, but the Court had repeatedly held that the assumption of 
risk defense was “impliedly authorized” by FELA.99 
The Arizona Court adamantly refused to read the Jones Act’s incorporation 
of FELA as having brought into seamen’s jurisprudence the assumed risk 
defense that the Court (in pre-Jones Act cases) had read into FELA, 
explaining: 
[T]he Jones Act does not, by its own terms, or by those adopted by reference 
from [FELA], prescribe that assumption of risk shall be a defense to the 
liability imposed for injuries to seamen . . . .  In the absence of such a definite 
command the scope of the new [Jones Act] rules of liability and the nature of 
the defenses to them must be ascertained by reference to their new setting in 
the admiralty system.100 
. . . . 
Before the Jones Act . . . . no American case appears to have recognized 
assumption of risk as a defense [in a seaman’s] suit. . . .101 
. . . . 
[Maritime law’s policies] require a like conclusion with respect to the modified 
and in some respects enlarged liability imported into the maritime law by the 
Jones Act.  The legislation was remedial, for the benefit and protection of 
seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty.  Its purpose was to enlarge 
that protection, not to narrow it.  Its provisions . . . are to be liberally construed 
to attain that end, and are to be interpreted in harmony with the established 
doctrine of maritime law of which it is an integral part. . . .  No provision of the 
Jones Act is inconsistent with the admiralty rule as to assumption of risk.  The 
purpose and terms of the Act and the nature of the juristic field in which it is to 
be applied, preclude the assumption that Congress intended, by its adoption, to 
modify that rule by implication.102 
Note carefully what the Arizona Court is saying: A defensive doctrine that is 
not expressly provided for by the Jones Act or FELA—but that has been read 
into FELA by judicial implication—cannot properly apply in seamen’s 
jurisprudence unless it fully matches the content and purposes of pre-existing 
maritime law. 
The Miles Court did exactly what the Arizona Court so eloquently 
condemned and then compounded the error by taking it a step further.  Among 
the FELA provisions incorporated into the Jones Act was 45 U.S.C. § 51, 
which gives the families of fatally injured workers a wrongful death remedy 
 
 99. Id. at 119–20. 
 100. Id. at 120. 
 101. Id. at 122. 
 102. The Arizona, 298 U.S. at 123 (citations omitted). 
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without spelling out the categories of damages available.103  In a pre-Jones Act 
case called Vreeland, the Supreme Court read into FELA’s wrongful death 
provision a pecuniary loss limit that precluded recovery for loss of society.104  
In Miles, the Court held as follows: 
  When Congress passed the Jones Act, the Vreeland gloss on FELA . . . 
[was] well established.  Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, 
Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on 
damages as well.  We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it 
passes legislation.  There is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act 
wrongful death action.105 
In affecting to believe that by incorporating FELA the Jones Act Congress 
intended to bring a into seamen’s jurisprudence a defensive doctrine that had 
been judicially implied into FELA, the Miles Court directly contravened the 
holding of The Arizona. 
The Miles Court then went a remarkable step further by extending the 
Jones Act defensive doctrine (a doctrine that it had only just discovered or 
invented) into maritime common law.106  The Miles plaintiff (the deceased 
seaman’s mother) was seeking loss of society damages in an action based on 
unseaworthiness, a non-statutory doctrine.107  Under the Court’s Moragne and 
Gaudet decisions,108 she was entitled to such damages.  But the Miles Court 
held that the Moragne-Gaudet maritime common law remedy was trumped by 
the defensive doctrine it had just implied into the Jones Act, stating: 
  The Jones Act [upon which the plaintiff was not relying] also precludes 
recovery for loss of society in this case.  The Jones Act applies when a seaman 
has been killed as a result of negligence, and [as we have just announced] it 
limits recovery to pecuniary loss.  The general [common law] maritime claim 
here alleged that Torregano had been killed as a result of the unseaworthiness 
of the vessel.  It would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional 
scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created 
cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in 
cases of deaths resulting from negligence.  We must conclude that there is no 
 
 103. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006) (original version at ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920)); 45 
U.S.C. § 51 (2006) (original version at ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 65–66 (1908)). 
 104. See Mich. Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 74 (1913). 
 105. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (citation omitted). 
 106. Id. at 36. 
 107. Id. at 21–22. 
 108. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970) (unanimously overruling 
Harrisburg and creating a new non-statutory maritime-death remedy); See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. 
v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 573–74, 587–88, (1974) (5-4 decision holding that the Moragne remedy 
includes nonpecuniary damages for loss of society). 
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recovery for loss of society in a general [common law] maritime action for the 
wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.109 
I cannot improve upon Judge Brown’s concluding characterization of this last-
quoted bit of Miles reasoning: “I believe I express a general, if not universal 
opinion of the legal profession in saying that the judgment was erroneous.”110 
D. What’s Next? 
The two Miles rulings recounted above in Section VC111 are dramatic 
departures from the long judicial tradition of carefully integrating statutes into 
the general maritime law.112  And the Court accompanied its dramatic rulings 
with some equally dramatic language.  Here are the two most startling 
examples: 
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones must look 
primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal protection from injury 
and death; Congress and the States have legislated extensively in these areas.  
In this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative 
enactments for policy guidance.  We may supplement these statutory remedies 
where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such policies 
consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must also keep strictly 
within the limits imposed by Congress.  Congress retains superior authority in 
these matters, and an admiralty court must be vigilant not to overstep the well-
considered boundaries imposed by federal legislation.113 
. . . . 
 
 109. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32–33. 
 110. Brown, supra note 2, at 285 (quoting Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 
336 (1857)). 
 111. In a third ruling, the Miles Court held that the Jones Act precludes plaintiffs in general 
maritime survival actions from recovering for the decedent’s lost future earnings.  See Miles, 498 
U.S. at 33–36. 
 112. Judge Brown’s thumbnail sketch of that tradition was as follows: 
The mere fact that Congress has legislated in an area is insufficient to preempt maritime 
remedies in the absence of Congressional purpose to do so.  The affirmative intervention 
of Congress in the maritime field should be interpreted in a positive and supportive 
fashion and should not be used to emasculate the power of admiralty judges to declare 
admiralty law.  As Justice Story concluded, [in Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. 
Me. 1823) (Case No. 6047)], even a strong implication by Congress is insufficient to 
deprive admiralty judges of their duty to enunciate the law in conformity with governing 
maritime principles.  Only an express prohibition by Congress can serve to deny admiralty 
judges the power to declare admiralty law which was delegated to them by the 
Constitution. 
Brown, supra note 2, at 284.  This manifesto might be seen as Judge Brown’s version of the 
“statutes in derogation” attitude; see sources cited supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 113. Miles, 498 U.S. at 27. 
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We sail in occupied waters.  Maritime tort law is now dominated by federal 
statute, and we are not free to expand remedies at will simply because it might 
work to the benefit of seamen and those dependent upon them.114 
The Court provided no citations in support of any of these claims and 
pronouncements.  When the Miles Court uttered them in 1990, they were brand 
new.115  They show that Judge Brown was right to say that Miles “represent[s] 
a complete reversal of the roles of admiralty judges and Congress.”116  We 
need to try to figure out whether this reversal is going to be a lasting change—
if so, it is a true sea change in the spirit of that metaphor—or something like a 
temporary aberration. 
1. Pro-Miles Signals. 
Since Miles, the Court has presented at least two additional demonstrations 
of the Miles role-reversal technique.  Probably the more important of the two is 
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co.117  The question in Dooley was whether 
general maritime law (maritime common law) includes a survival remedy 
enabling the estate or survivors of persons killed on the high seas to recover for 
the decedents’ pre-death pain and suffering.118  As the Miles Court had 
correctly noted, “DOHSA contains no survival provision.”119  The nearest 
thing to a survival provision in DOHSA is a non-abatement provision, which 
provides in pertinent part: 
  If a civil action in admiralty is pending in a court of the United States to 
recover for personal injury caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default 
[occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the 
United States], and the individual dies during the action as a result of the 
wrongful act, neglect, or default, the personal representative of the decedent 
 
 114. Id. at 36. 
 115. But see Brown, supra note 2, at 277–79 (arguing that the 1978 decision in Higginbotham 
strongly foreshadowed Miles). 
 116. Id. at 283. 
 117. 524 U.S. 116 (1998). 
 118. Id. at 118.  The Court’s Moragne decision created a general maritime wrongful death 
remedy to redress the losses sustained by the families of the victims of maritime fatal accidents.  
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 621 (1977).  The existence of a general 
maritime survival remedy—to redress the fatal-accident victim’s own losses sustained in the 
interval between injury and death, such as conscious pain and suffering—was not addressed but 
seemed implicit in Moragne.  E.g., Evich v. Connelly, 759 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985); Law 
v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1975); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 
799–800 (1st Cir. 1974); Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe, Jr., & Assocs., Inc., 466 F.2d 903, 909 (8th 
Cir. 1972).  But see Miles, 498 U.S. at 34 (“declin[ing] to address the issue” whether general 
maritime law includes a survival remedy but going on to hold that if such a remedy exists, it does 
not allow for recovery of the decedent’s lost future earnings). 
 119. Miles, 498 U.S. at 35. 
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may be substituted as the plaintiff and the action may proceed [as a wrongful 
death action] under this chapter . . . .120 
On its face, this provision has nothing to do with whether the estate or 
survivors of the victim of a fatal accident on the high seas can recover for the 
victim’s own pain and suffering.  Yet the Dooley Court (in a unanimous 
decision written by Justice Thomas) termed the provision a “limited survival 
provision,” and held that it signaled Congress’s “considered judgment” that the 
survival damages at issue in the case could not be recovered.121  Without 
mentioning Miles, the Dooley opinion echoed the Miles reasoning, stating: 
Even in the exercise of our admiralty jurisdiction, we will not upset the balance 
struck by Congress by authorizing a cause of action [i.e., the pre-death pain 
and suffering remedy] with which Congress was certainly familiar but 
nonetheless declined to adopt. . . .  Because Congress has chosen not to 
authorize a survival action for a decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering, there 
can be no general maritime survival action for such damages.122 
The Court then added a stern, Miles-like footnote: “Accordingly, we need not 
decide whether general maritime law ever provides a survival action.”123 
The other post-Miles role-reversal demonstration came in Norfolk 
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris.124  By the very terms of the Court’s 
1970 decision in Moragne,125 the general maritime wrongful-death remedy 
created in that case—which happened to involve a death caused by a vessel’s 
unseaworthiness—applied to all “death[s] caused by violation of maritime 
duties.”126  The fatal accident victim in Garris—a shipyard worker killed by 
the negligence of one of the contractors on the job where the victim was 
working—was indisputably killed by the violation of the general maritime duty 
to avoid negligence.127  Yet for reasons that are virtually inexplicable, the 
Garris Court took it as unsettled whether the Moragne remedy applied.  The 
Court’s opinion (written by Justice Scalia) eventually reached the only possible 
 
 120. 46 U.S.C. § 30305 (2006). 
 121. Dooley, 524 U.S. at 118, 124 (citation omitted). 
 122. Id. at 124.  The Court thought that the Congress that enacted DOHSA in 1920 had to be 
familiar with the pre-death pain and suffering remedy because the Jones Act, enacted that same 
year, had authorized a survival remedy in seamen’s families’ fatal-injury actions by incorporating 
FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 59.  Id. 
 123. Id. at 124 n.2 (emphasis in original). 
 124. 532 U.S. 811 (2001). 
 125. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970). 
 126. Id. at 376, 409. 
 127. Garris, 532 U.S. at 812–13.  The countless judicial recognitions of this maritime duty 
include Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959) and 
Brotherhood Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 985 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
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answer—of course.  But Justice Scalia was inspired to conclude with a Miles-
like flourish: 
Because of Congress’s extensive involvement in legislating causes of action 
for maritime personal injuries, it will be the better course, in many cases that 
assert new claims beyond what those statutes [viz., the Jones Act and the 
LHWCA] have seen fit to allow, to leave further development to Congress.  
The cause of action [viz., the wrongful-death remedy] we recognize today, 
however, is new only in the most technical sense.  The general maritime law 
has recognized the tort of negligence for more than a century, and it has been 
clear since Moragne that breaches of a maritime duty are actionable when they 
cause death, as when they cause injury.  Congress’s occupation of this field is 
not yet so extensive as to preclude us from recognizing what is already 
logically compelled by our precedents.128 
2. Arguable (and Fairly Weak) Anti-Miles Signals. 
There are recent judicial dicta offering a bit of comfort.  Justice Ginsburg 
(joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) wrote separately in Garris to express 
disagreement with Justice Scalia’s concluding Miles-inspired flourish, stating: 
I agree with the Court’s clear opinion with one reservation.  In Part II-B-2, the 
Court counsels: “Because of Congress’s extensive involvement in legislating 
causes of action for maritime personal injuries, it will be the better course, in 
many cases that assert new claims beyond what those statutes . . . allow, to 
leave further development to Congress.”  Moragne itself, however, tugs in the 
opposite direction.  Inspecting the relevant legislation, the Court in Moragne 
found no measures counseling against the judicial elaboration of general 
maritime law there advanced.  In accord with Moragne, I see development of 
the law in admiralty as a shared venture in which “federal common 
lawmaking” does not stand still, but “harmonize[s] with the enactments of 
Congress in the field.”  I therefore do not join in the Court’s dictum.129 
In a similar vein, Justice Souter wrote for the Court in its 2008 decision in 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker that “maritime law . . . falls within a federal 
court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law court, subject to 
the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial 
result.”130 
And there is one important holding, the Court’s closely divided (5–4) 
decision in 2009 in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, holding that neither the 
Jones Act nor Miles stands in the way of actions seeking punitive damages 
against employers who flout the obligation to provide maintenance (food and 
 
 128. Garris, 532 U.S. at 820. 
 129. Id. at 821 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 130. 554 U.S. 471, 489–90 (2008). 
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lodging) and cure (medical care) to sick and injured seamen.131  To evaluate 
the Townsend Court’s treatment of Miles, we need to remember the two-step 
process in Miles: The Miles Court first discovered a prohibition in the Jones 
Act (against loss-of-society damages) and then extended that prohibition into 
the maritime common law field of unseaworthiness.132  Similarly, the employer 
in Townsend—contending that punitive damages were unavailable—made a 
two-step argument, contending: a) that punitive damages are not awardable in 
Jones Act actions; and b) that this prohibition should extend into the maritime 
common law field of maintenance and cure.133 
Writing for the Townsend majority, Justice Thomas said it was 
unnecessary to decide whether punitive damages are recoverable in Jones Act 
actions because, even if such a prohibition did exist, taking it into the 
maintenance-and-cure field would be an unwarranted stretch of the Miles 
approach.134  “The reasoning of Miles remains sound,”135 Justice Thomas said, 
but the employer’s “reading of Miles is far too broad.”136  The Miles and 
Townsend situations were crucially different in the following respect: Whereas 
the damages sought in Miles (wrongful death damages for loss of society 
resulting from an unseaworthiness-caused death) would not have been 
available under maritime law prior to the enactment of the Jones Act and 
DOHSA in 1920, the rights asserted in Townsend were in no sense dependent 
on congressional action: “[B]oth the general maritime cause of action 
(maintenance and cure) and the remedy (punitive damages) were well 
established before the passage of the Jones Act.”137 
That is a fairly nuanced distinction of Miles, and it seems far from 
anything a careful observer would call repudiation or even significant 
weakening of Miles.  Moreover, it must be remembered that four dissenters 
(led by Justice Alito) would have cheerfully extended the Miles approach to 
wipe out punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases.138  Still, those of us 
who think that the Miles role-reversal announcements were deeply unfortunate 
need to look for comfort where we can find it, and Townsend is at least a 
somewhat hopeful sign. 
 
 131. 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2565 (2009).  For a full discussion of Townsend, see David W. 
Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. 
REV. 463, 497–99 (2010). 
 132. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 37 (1990). 
 133. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. at 2571–73. 
 134. Id. at 2575 n.12. 
 135. Id. at 2572. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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VI.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PRACTICALITIES OF FUTURE LITIGATION 
It is sometimes doubted whether historical-analytical treatments of an area 
of the law are of much benefit to practically-oriented litigators.  But I believe it 
is always helpful to know as much about the historical and conceptual 
background of working doctrine as possible.  In addition, I think there are 
some clear practical pointers to be gained. 
A. Rely Heavily on Statutes Whenever Possible 
This first practical pointer is completely obvious.  Regardless of how the 
statutory-common law balance in admiralty and maritime law eventually plays 
out in the post-Miles era, a litigator is obviously well advised to wrap his 
client’s position in a statute if this is in any way possible.  I offer two 
illustrations of this truth.  The first is the Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart 
v. Dutra Construction Co., which expanded the coverage of the Jones Act by 
holding that Section 3 of the Rules of Construction Act defined the term 
“vessel” for LHWCA and Jones Act purposes as any “description of water-
craft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means 
of transportation on water.”139  The unanimous Stewart Court—a Court not 
predisposed to the expansion of seamen’s rights—acknowledged that its 
expansion of Jones Act coverage “sweeps broadly,”140 but the Court seemed 
completely cheerful about that, because it was able to attribute the result 
entirely to Congress. 
The second illustration of the special potency of statutory arguments is the 
Fifth Circuit’s pair of opinions in Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding Co.141  This was 
a post-Stewart case in which the question was “whether an unpowered 
floatable . . . quarterbarge”—“in effect, a floating dormitory”—that had been 
“moored in a private boat slip at Holly Beach in Cameron Parish” for about a 
month, at the time of the plaintiff’s accident, was a Jones Act vessel.142  In its 
first opinion, the Fifth Circuit panel (over Judge DeMoss’s dissent) relied on 
the Fifth Circuit’s copious pre-Stewart vessel-status jurisprudence to “find 
inescapable the conclusion that the [quarterbarge] is not a ‘vessel.’”143  
Turning to the Supreme Court’s brand-new Stewart decision, the Fifth Circuit 
said that Stewart did “not fundamentally alter [the Fifth Circuit’s] ‘vessel’ 
 
 139. 543 U.S. 481, 489 (2005) (quoting 1 Rev. Stat. of 1873 §§ 1, 3 (1875) (codified as 
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 3 (2006)). 
 140. Id. at 494. 
 141. Holmes v. Atl. Sounding Co. (Holmes II), 437 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006); Holmes v. Atl. 
Sounding Co. (Holmes I), 2005 AMC 2612 (previously published at 429 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2005) 
and subsequently withdrawn). 
 142. Holmes I, 2005 AMC at 2613–14. 
 143. Id. at 2624. 
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jurisprudence”144 and that Stewart made Section 3 of the Rules of Construction 
Act “merely the starting point for a determination whether an unconventional 
watercraft is a vessel for Jones Act . . . purposes.”145 
When the Holmes plaintiff moved for a rehearing, the application was 
supported by an amicus brief of two admiralty law professors, who 
summarized the holding of Stewart as follows: 
1 U.S.C. § 3—which states in its entirety that “[t]he word ‘vessel’ includes 
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable 
of being used, as a means of transportation on water”—supplies the definition 
of the LHWCA term vessel and thus defines the term for purposes of 
determining Jones Act seaman status.  This is true, the Stewart Court plainly 
says, because Congress has said so.  There is no suggestion in the Court’s 
treatment that § 3 is a mere starting point; on the contrary, it is Congress’s 
controlling definition of the term.146 
The Fifth Circuit then granted a panel rehearing, withdrew its earlier opinion, 
and issued a new opinion stating: “Consistent with Stewart’s expanded 
definition of [the] term [‘vessel’], we have no trouble concluding that the 
[quarterbarge] is a vessel.”147 
Counsel for the Holmes plaintiff and for the plaintiff’s professorial amici 
might enjoy attributing the distance traveled by the Holmes Court in its 
characterizations of the quarterbarge—all the way from “inescapable” non-
vessel status to “no trouble” vessel status—to counsel’s remarkable eloquence.  
But there is little doubt that the shift resulted almost entirely from the potency 
of the statutory argument.  The Fifth Circuit might at times be a bit hostile to 
the Supreme Court’s sporadic incursions into the Circuit’s own familiar 
jurisprudential territory; but it is far less likely to resist a congressional 
command. 
B. Other Practical Tips 
Miles has opened up a potential panoply of arguments about “the 
penumbras of legislation that might apply to some related area.”148  Obviously 
counsel should be alert for opportunities to exploit such arguments. 
I am more comfortable thinking about ways of resisting them.  One mode 
of resistance might entail attacks (subtle ones, of course) on Miles itself.  In the 
 
 144. Id. at 2620. 
 145. Id. at 2622 (emphasis in original). 
 146. Brief of Admiralty Professors David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant’s Petitions for Panel or En Banc Rehearing at 6, Holmes v. 
Atl. Sounding Co. (Holmes II), 437 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 04-30732, 05-30750) 
(emphasis in original). 
 147. Holmes II, 437 F.3d at 448 (emphasis added). 
 148. Brown, supra note 2, at 284. 
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foregoing sections, this Article provides citations to criticisms of Miles,149 
demonstrates that Miles is flatly contrary to The Arizona v. Anelich,150 and 
offers references to post-Miles Supreme Court decisions that might be used to 
work some kind of shrinkage on the Miles approach.151 
This Article also shows that Justice O’Connor—the author of Miles—has 
at least once (and maybe twice) shown that she is capable of running 
roughshod over congressional language.152  This Article’s suggestion that 
Miles constitutes a form of disguised disrespect for Congress153 seems to me to 
generate a respectable argument that might be useful in litigation if carefully 
and respectfully advanced. 
Finally, as a way of resisting statutory (and especially statutory-penumbra) 
arguments, I recommend close study of the techniques used by Justice Story to 
avoid the unwanted statutory implication in Harden v. Gordon.154  This study 
could well be augmented by research into the state law jurisprudence centering 
on “statutes in derogation of the common law.”155  The message that might be 
gleaned from such study: A common law judge must do what the legislature 
says, but the judge is not always required to do what the legislature implies, at 
least not unless it is entirely clear that the legislature meant to require it. 
 
 149. See supra Part VC (discussing the Miles decision and its subsequent effects on statutory 
interpretation). 
 150. See supra Part VC (discussing and contrasting the Court’s decision in Miles with that of 
The Arizona v. Anelich). 
 151. See supra part VD2. (discussing the treatment of Miles in two subsequent Court 
decisions). 
 152. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra Part VC (suggesting that Miles overstepped Congress’s boundaries regarding 
statutory interpretation). 
 154. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483–84 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047).  See supra 
notes 28–34 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
